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Abstract 
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adaptation and motivation. We determine the conditions under which first–best project and 
effort choices are implementable and show that these conditions can become relaxed as the 
team grows in size. This contrasts with the common argument (based on free–riding) that 
efficiency is harder to achieve in larger teams. We also characterize the second–best 
mechanism and find that decision–making may be biased either in favor or against the team’s 
initially preferred alternative.  
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“The members of an organization may be seen as providing two kinds of ser-
vices: they supply inputs for production and process information for decision–
making.” Bengt Holmstrom (1982)
1 Introduction
This paper examines joint decision–making in teams where members exert individual
efforts to execute an agreed decision. Such situations are ubiquitous. For example, mem-
bers of government cabinets choose policy and then spend political capital ensuring its
success. In joint ventures, firms determine the characteristics of their common product
and invest into its development and marketing. Parents agree on an upbringing approach
and then struggle to impose it on their children. Within organizations the prevalence of
self–managed teams is reportedly growing over time (Manz and Sims, 1993).
In the above examples, execution efforts are arguably non–contractible and it is well
known that moral hazard leads to free–riding. However, when team members have a
common interest in choosing the best project, one might think that they should be able
to share information efficiently and reach the best possible decision. Nevertheless, teams
with largely aligned incentives often fail to communicate valuable information and end
up with sub–optimal decisions.1
Our starting point is the observation that the desire to keep ‘morale’ high at the
execution stage may hinder information–sharing and lead to sub–optimal choices at the
decision–making stage. Consider for instance two co–authors choosing between two alter-
native scientific projects. Suppose that, ex ante, both authors expect that project A is
more likely to be successful. Further suppose that one author receives information, e.g.
feedback in a seminar, indicating that project B is more likely to be successful than A
but less likely than project A was expected to be ex ante. In this situation the author
faces a trade–off. By concealing the news and working on project A, he can maintain his
co–author’s high level of motivation, based on the optimistic (but incorrect) prior expec-
tations. Instead, by sharing his information, the team can adapt to the news by adopting
1A classic example of a cohesive team making wrong–headed decisions is the Kennedy administration
during the Bay of Pigs invasion (Janis, 1982). Similar behavior has been documented using firm (Perlow,
2003) and laboratory studies (Stasser and Titus, 1985, Gigone and Hastie, 1993).
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the ex post more promising project B.
This trade–off between motivation and adaptation has long been recognized by schol-
ars of group decision–making as critical to the understanding of why information which
questions the prevailing consensus frequently remains unshared (Perlow and Williams
2003). It is often most dramatic in military settings, where maintaining morale is key.
For instance, President George W. Bush admitted that, while privately aware throughout
2006 of the increasing likelihood of failure in Iraq, he continued to produce upbeat public
assessments, thereby easing public pressure to correct his existing strategy, in order to
avoid diminishing troops’ morale.2 The view that a commitment to an initially preferred
alternative represents a threat to the frank exchange of information also resonates with
lessons from social psychology (Stasser, 1999) and political science (T’Hart, 1990), as well
as with views expressed by practitioners.3
To examine the above trade–off formally, Section 2 presents a model of team produc-
tion in which two identical individuals select and work on one out of two feasible projects.
A project’s likelihood of success depends positively on the team members’ unobservable
efforts and the project’s state–contingent “quality”. Individual efforts are independent
inputs of team production. Project choice and efforts are complementary, as returns to
effort are increasing in the project’s quality. Each team member privately obtains (with
some probability) verifiable evidence about the state of the world. Ex ante project A is
expected to be better than project B, but information is valuable since project B is better
when the state is B. In the first–best benchmark, team members select the best project,
conditional on their aggregate information, and exert efficient levels of effort.
We use a mechanism design approach to determine the conditions under which the first
best is implementable. Under the assumptions of limited liability and budget balance,
Section 3 shows that the first best fails to be implementable when the value of adapting
the project to the available information is low relative to the value of motivating one’s
2Interview with Martha Raddat, ABC News on April 11, 2008, transcript available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=4634219&page=1.
3Alfred P. Sloan once terminated a GM senior executive meeting with the following statement:
“Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here. Then I propose we
postpone further discussion on this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop
disagreement, and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is all about.” Taken from
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/management/displaystory.cfm?story id=13047099.
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colleague. We find that the mechanism implementing the benchmark in the widest range
of parameters rewards the (unilateral) disclosure of information that is unpopular i.e. in
conflict with the team’s initially preferred alternative. Thus, while it has been suggested
that those willing to challenge the status quo should be protected from retaliation by
other team members (Janis, 1982, T’Hart, 1990), our results suggest that dissenting
voices should be actively rewarded.
Although the presence of private information often represents a challenge to the imple-
mentability of the first best, we find that, in some occasions, the asymmetry of information
turns out to be beneficial. In particular, the first best turns out to be implementable in
an area of the parameter space for which efficiency could not be obtained if evidence was
observed publicly rather than privately. As in Hermalin’s (1998) model of leadership, the
presence of asymmetric information alleviates the team’s free–riding problem. In our set-
ting this holds even though agents are ex ante identical and have no access to a signaling
technology.
In Section 4 we consider how the implementability of the first best depends on the size
of the team. Contrary to a standard free-riding argument, we show that an increase in
team size may improve efficiency by making the first best become implementable. This
is because, although potentially detrimental for the incentive to exert effort, an increase
in team size can improve the members’ willingness to share information. Critical to
this result is the fact that the optimal mechanism rewards the disclosure of unpopular
information. If instead, revenue is allocated independently of the disclosed evidence, then
an increase in team size not only exacerbates free–riding but also worsens information–
sharing. This underlines the importance of rewarding dissent in a team setting.
We also introduce heterogeneity into our framework and find that members who are
less productive or more likely to be informed have a stronger incentive to conceal their
information. The optimal mechanism accounts for this asymmetry by giving these mem-
bers a smaller stake in the initially preferred project. The fact that, in practice, higher
stakes are usually associated with better information, might therefore explain some of the
decision–making failures mentioned above.
In Section 5 we return to our baseline model and determine the optimal mechanism
for the case where the first best fails to be implementable. We first characterize the
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conditions under which the first–best project choice can be implemented, at the expense
of inefficient effort levels. The corresponding mechanism induces one member to exert
inefficiently low effort in the absence of evidence by assigning a disproportionately large
share of revenue to the other member. While for the disadvantaged member concealment
is deterred by the threat of receiving a low share of revenue, for the advantaged member
concealment ceases to have a positive effect on the colleague’s effort. The shortcoming
of this arrangement is that it may fail to be collusion–proof. This is the case when the
value of motivation is high, since then team members will overcome the induced effort
distortion by use of a side–contract. We therefore conclude that the first–best project
choice cannot be implemented for high values of motivation, even when effort levels are
allowed to differ from the first best.
If not only effort but also project choices are allowed to be inefficient, there exist exactly
two alternative ways to strengthen the team members’ incentive to disclose unpopular
information. The first is to inefficiently choose project B over project A in the absence
of evidence, thereby introducing a negative bias to the team’s decision making. This
gives team members an incentive to disclose evidence in favor of B, since its concealment
no longer increases the colleague’s motivation. Therefore, a decision rule which makes
“unpopular” choices when no evidence is produced by the team members can induce the
revelation of information in conflict with prior expectations.
The second possibility is to bias the team’s project choice positively i.e. in the direction
of its initially preferred alternative. The corresponding mechanism selects project A even
when evidence in favor of B has been observed by (exactly) one member. Importantly,
the evidence communicated to the designer by the informed member fails to be shared
with the other. As a result, the uninformed member can be induced to exert inefficiently
high effort on project A giving the informed member the incentive to disclose B. This
mechanism resonates with the examples above, where information in conflict with prior
expectations fails to be shared in order to maintain morale and at the cost of a failure to
adapt.
The relative size of the values of motivation and adaptation determines which of
the three arrangements above constitutes the second–best mechanism. As the value of
motivation increases, the second–best project allocation switches from being unbiased, to
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having a negative bias, to having a positive bias. One way to interpret the decision–rule’s
bias is as the inherent conservatism of the organisation (Li 2001). Our findings therefore
suggest that a team’s optimal degree of conservatism is non–monotonic in the relative
value of motivation.
We conclude our analysis in Section 6 by considering the robustness of our results. We
show that the first best fails to be implementable even when the team members observe
non–verifiable signals about the state of the world, and when team production exhibits
complementarities. We find that increasing the signals’ precision or the strength of com-
plementarities enlarges the set of parameters for which the first best can be implemented.
Related literature
Attempts to explain why groups often fail to aggregate information efficiently have largely
focused on the importance of conflicting preferences (Li, Rosen, and Suen, 2001; Des-
sein 2007), the existence of career concerns (Ottaviani and Sorensen, 2001; Levy, 2007;
Visser and Swank, 2007) and the distortions generated by voting rules (Feddersen and
Pesendorfer, 1998). In our model, team members share the common goal of selecting the
best project and voting rules and career concerns play no role. Our focus is instead on
the trade–off between the quality of the project and the team’s morale at the execution
stage. This emphasis is novel to the literature on group decision–making and hence com-
plementary to existing work.4 Persico (2004) and Gerardi and Yariv (2007) also combine
decision–making and incentives but their focus is on incentives to acquire information
rather than on incentives to execute a common decision.
The trade–off between adaptation and motivation is at the core of a few recent papers,
but mostly in settings where decision–making and execution lie at different levels of the
organizational hierarchy (Zabojnik, 2002; Blanes i Vidal and Mo¨ller, 2007; Landier et
al., 2009).5 An exception in this respect is Banal–Estan˜ol and Seldeslachts (2009), who
4A very different notion of group morale is employed by Benabou’s (2008) model of collective delusion,
where agents decide whether to engage in “reality denial” about an exogenously given productivity
parameter.
5A related literature studies organizations where different divisions need to be encouraged to exert
effort and to take decisions that are both coordinated and adapted to local circumstances (Dessein et al.,
2009; Rantakari, 2009). We assume a common project choice, and so coordination is not an issue.
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study merger decisions and show that the incentive to free–ride on a potential partner’s
post–merger efforts may hinder decision–making at the pre–merger stage. We differ from
them in that we use a general team framework and a mechanism design approach.
Our result that commitment to an ex post inefficient decision can improve the com-
munication of information in teams is related to Gerardi and Yariv (2007) who show
that such commitment can induce the acquisition of costly information (see also Li 2001
and Szalay 2005). In our application this commitment might be achieved by delegat-
ing decision–making to an outsider (i.e. a manager), an argument that is reminiscent of
Holmstrom’s (1982) well–known budget breaking solution and Dessein’s (2007) finding
that decision-making can be improved through “leadership”.
In our model, the mechanism designer chooses implicitly whether to communicate to
one team member the information reported by the other. This role of the designer as
intermediary between two parties links our paper to the literature on optimal information
disclosure. In Rayo and Segal (2010), for instance, the principal’s role is to transform
a report sent by an advertiser into a signal observed by a consumer. Coarsening the
information revealed by the parties in a potential conflict is also the function of the
mediator in Ho¨rner et al. (2011). Similar roles are played by the intermediaries in the
two–sided market models of Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010) and Hagiu and Jullien (2011).
One major difference relative to these papers is that in our model, the mechanism designer
not only influences communication but also selects the team’s project.
The assumption of limited liability is important for our results. In its absence the
first best can be easily implemented by punishing (sufficiently) a team member who fails
to report evidence when his colleague happens to do so. Our paper is therefore related
to the literature examining how limited liability constraints hinder the implementability
of first–best outcomes in mechanism–design settings (Robert 1991, Demougin and Garvie
1991, Demski, Sappington and Spiller 1987, Gary–Bobo and Spiegel 2006).6
6Limited liability is a reasonable assumption in many settings. In managerial accounting, for instance,
the assumption has been used to explain issues such as earnings management and capital budgeting (Arya,
Glover and Sunder 1998, Demski and Dye 1999 and Lambert 2001).
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2 The model
We consider a team with two identical members i = 1, 2.7 The team’s purpose is to choose
and execute one out of two mutually exclusive projects x ∈ X ≡ {A,B}. A project may be
either successful or unsuccessful. If a project is successful it creates a revenue normalized
to R = 1, otherwise its revenue is R = 0. Project x’s likelihood of success is increasing
in the team members’ efforts ei and depends on a state variable y ∈ Y ≡ {A,B}. We
assume that it takes the following form:
Pr(R = 1|x, y, e1, e2) = pxy · f(e1, e2). (1)
The parameter pxy ≥ 0 denotes project x’s state dependent “quality”. We say that one
project is better than the other if it has a higher quality. According to (1), project choice
and effort are complementary inputs of production. This assumption is standard in the
literature on organizations and empirical support has been provided by Rosen (1982).
We assume that information about the state is valuable, i.e. pAA > pBA and pBB >
pAB. If one of these inequalities was reversed, one project would be better independently
of the state. We give sense to the notion that it is important to adapt the project choice
to the state of the world by assuming that project x has a higher quality if it matches the
state y, i.e. pAA > pAB and pBB > pBA.
Team members have a common prior about the state. To simplify the exposition we
consider the case where both states are equally likely. Our results remain qualitatively
unchanged when this assumption is relaxed. Without loss of generality we choose A to
be the project that is expected to be better ex ante, i.e.
p¯A =
1
2
(pAA + pAB) >
1
2
(pBA + pBB) = p¯B. (2)
Team members may hold private information about the state. In particular, we assume
that member i observes verifiable evidence for y with probability q ∈ (0, 1) while with
probability 1− q he observes nothing.8
7The issues of team size and heterogeneity are the subject of Section 4.
8The assumption that private information is either perfect or non–existent simplifies Bayesian updating
in models of joint decision–making and is shared by Visser and Swank (2007). See Section 6 for the case
of unverifiable and imperfect signals.
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Team member i chooses an effort level ei ∈ {0, 1} incurring the cost C(ei) with C(0) =
0 < c = C(1). Efforts are unobservable and non–contractible. Since team members
are identical and efforts are binary, the production function f can take three values.
Indexing f by the number of team members who exert effort, these values are denoted as
0 < f0 < f1 < f2. To simplify the analysis, we assume that efforts are independent, i.e.
f2 − f1 = f1 − f0 ≡ ∆f .9
We show below that for high ∆f , team members can be induced to exert effort on
both projects, while for low ∆f , effort cannot be induced for any of the two. In both
cases, project choice would have no influence on the team members’ efforts. As we show
below, a trade–off between adaptation and motivation exists when effort can be induced
for one project but not for the other. Our main analysis focuses on the case where
2c
p¯A
< ∆f <
c
pBB
. (3)
The first inequality guarantees that, in the absence of any evidence, both team members
can be induced to exert effort on the ex ante preferred project A by receiving half of its
revenue. The second inequality implies that a team member is not willing to exert effort
on project B even when he has observed evidence in favor or B and receives its entire
revenue. A discussion of the case where ∆f ≤ 2c
p¯A
is postponed until the end of Section 3.
Finally, in order to simplify the exposition, we normalize by setting pAA = 1 and
pBA = 0. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged if we allow these values to be
general. We will discuss the problem in a two–dimensional parameter space. The x–axis
will measure the value of motivation ∆f corresponding to an increase in the colleague’s
effort. The y–axis will measure the value of adaptation pBB
pAB
. The trade–off between
adaptation and motivation exists in the subset
T (pAB, c) = {(∆f, pBB
pAB
)| 2c
p¯A
< ∆f <
c
pBB
,
pBB
pAB
> 1} (4)
of the parameter space. To guarantee that T is non–empty and that Pr(R = 1) ≤ 1 for
9In Section 6 we show that our main initial result extends to the case where efforts are complementary.
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all (∆f, pBB
pAB
) ∈ T the following parametric restrictions are necessary and sufficient:10
f0 < 1, c <
1− f0
6
, pAB ∈ [ 2c
1− f0 ,
1
3
). (5)
A mechanism design approach
Following Myerson (1982), we use a mechanism design approach to determine the team’s
optimal institution. In a mechanism, each team member sends a message conditional on
his private information. Depending on these messages, the mechanism selects a project,
specifies the team members’ outcome–contingent compensation, and recommends effort
levels.
Formally, let si ∈ {A,B, ∅} denote member i’s private information or type. Here we
use ∅ to denote the event in which member i has failed to observe evidence. The set of
possible type profiles s = (s1, s2) is given by
S = {(A,A), (A, ∅), (∅, A), (∅, ∅), (B, ∅), (∅, B), (B,B)}. (6)
Member i sendsmessage,mi(si), to the mechanism designer, conditional on his type. Since
information is assumed to be verifiable evidence, message spaces are type–dependent.
More specifically, type si = y ∈ Y chooses mi ∈ Mi(y) = {y, ∅} whereas type si = ∅ can
only issue mi ∈Mi(∅) = {∅}.11
A mechanism (xˆ, eˆr1, eˆ
r
2, w1, w2) consists of a project allocation xˆ : S → X , recom-
mended effort allocations eˆri : S → {0, 1}, and outcome–contingent compensation schemes
wi : S × {0, 1} → [0, 1]. It induces a (Bayesian) game defined by the following sequence
of events: (1) Members observe (private) information s ∈ S. (2) Members send mes-
sages mi(si) ∈ Mi(si) to the mechanism designer simultaneously and confidentially. (3)
The designer selects project xˆ(m1, m2), makes effort recommendations eˆ
r
i (m1, m2) and
10 T 6= ∅ if and only if ∆fmin ≡ 2c
p¯A
< c
pAB
≡ ∆fmax ⇔ pAB < 13 . Pr(R = 1) ≤ 1 for all (∆f, pBBpAB ) ∈ T
if and only if f0 + 2∆f
max ≤ 1⇔ f0 < 1 and pAB ≥ 2c1−f0 . [ 2c1−f0 , 13 ) 6= ∅ if and only if c <
1−f0
6 .
11While message spaces are typically part of the designer’s choice, in the presence of verifiable infor-
mation, the disclosure of evidence has to be seen as the members’ inalienable action. Bull and Watson
(2007) show that this restriction has no influence on the set of implementable allocations if type si can
declare his type to be s′i if and only if all of the evidence available to type s
′
i is also available to type si.
In our setting this condition is satisfied since type si = y can declare to be type si = ∅ but not viceversa.
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announces compensation schemes wi(m1, m2, .). (4) Members choose unobservable efforts
ei ∈ {0, 1}. (5) Revenue R ∈ {0, 1} is realized and member i receives compensation
wi(m1, m2, R) ∈ [0, 1].
Implicit in the definition of a compensation scheme is the assumption that team mem-
bers are protected by limited liability, i.e. wi ≥ 0. We also require budget balance, i.e.
w1+w2 = R.
12 Following Levitt and Snyder (1997), we further assume that team members
have a zero reservation utility. Since wi ≥ 0 and C(0) = 0 this implies that participation is
not an issue, neither at the ex ante nor at the interim stage. Finally, we require the mech-
anism to be interim collusion–proof. In particular, after the project has been selected by
the mechanism, and before team members exert effort, the compensation scheme (w1, w2)
has to be such that no other compensation scheme (w′1, w
′
2) would be preferred by both
team members. Otherwise team members would sign a side–contract rendering void the
original agreement.13
We say that the mechanism (xˆ, eˆr1, eˆ
r
2, w1, w2) implements the allocation (xˆ, eˆ1, eˆ2) if it
is an equilibrium for team members to report their types truthfully (mi = si) and to follow
their effort recommendations obediently (ei = eˆ
r
i (s)) for all s ∈ S. An allocation (xˆ, eˆ1, eˆ2)
is said to be implementable when there exists a mechanism that implements it. According
to the revelation principle, the restriction to mechanisms and equilibria of the above form
comes at no loss to generality with respect to the set of implementable allocations.14
Note however that we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. As we will see, this
restriction has no influence on the implementability of the first–best allocation. Allowing
for random mechanisms only affects the characterization of the second best. For details
see our discussion at the end of Section 5.
12While budget balance can be relaxed, limited liability is necessary for our results. With unlimited
liability, the disclosure of information can be induced by the threat of sufficiently severe punishments. A
detailed discussion can be found at the end of Section 3.
13Collusion–proofness affects the second–best mechanism but has no influence on the implementability
of the first best. See Section 5 for details.
14Green and Laffont (1986) show that with type–dependent message spaces, the revelation principle
remains valid when message spaces satisfy a so called Nested Range Condition. In our setting this
condition is trivially satisfied.
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The first best benchmark
As a benchmark consider the case where all information is observed publicly, i.e. by
both team members. Let us determine the allocation (xˆ∗, eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2) that maximizes the team
members’ aggregate surplus. For this purpose, let Sy = {(y, y), (y, ∅), (∅, y)} denote the
event where the state y ∈ {A,B} has been observed. pAA > pBA implies that xˆ∗(s) = A
for all s ∈ SA. Similarly pBB > pAB implies that xˆ∗(s) = B for all s ∈ SB. Finally, since
project A is expected to have a higher quality ex ante, i.e. p¯A > p¯B, it has to hold that
xˆ∗(∅, ∅) = A. In summary, the efficient project allocation requires project A to become
selected unless evidence in favor of project B has been observed.
With respect to the efficient allocation of efforts our assumptions imply that pBB∆f <
c < p¯A∆f . Hence efforts on project B should be low independently of the team’s ob-
servation. In contrast, efforts on project A should be high unless the team has observed
evidence in favor of project B. Formally, eˆ∗i (s) = 0 for all s ∈ SB and eˆ∗i (s) = 1 for all
s ∈ SA ∪ {(∅, ∅)}.
Since Holmstrom (1982), it is well established that team production may suffer from
an under–provision of effort. To see this, note that for c
p¯A
< ∆f < 2c
p¯A
, efficiency would
require both team members to exert effort on project A, but only one team member could
be induced to do so by receiving a sufficiently high share of revenue.15 We focus on the
case where ∆f > 2c
p¯A
in order to study the trade–off between adaptation and motivation
in a setting where it represents the unique source of inefficiency. This means that in the
symmetric–information benchmark, surplus is equal to its first–best value given by
W ∗ =
1
2
(f2 − 2c) + 1
2
[(1− q)2(pABf2 − 2c) + (1− (1− q)2)pBBf0]. (7)
In the next section we determine the conditions under which this value can be achieved
in the presence of asymmetric information about the projects’ qualities.
15Limited liability obstructs approximate efficiency to be implementable with the help of mediated
contracts in the spirit of Rahman and Obara (2010).
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3 Implementability of the first best
In order to implement the first best we need to find compensation schemes w1, w2, such
that the efficient allocation (xˆ∗, eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2) is implemented by the mechanism (xˆ
∗, eˆ∗1, eˆ
∗
2, w1, w2).
Since budget balance and limited liability imply that wi(m1, m2, 0) = 0 we can simplify
notation by defining wi(m1, m2) ≡ wi(m1, m2, 1).
The compensation schemes have to induce the truthful revelation of information and
provide the team members with incentives to choose efficient effort levels. Since the first–
best allocation is the same for all s ∈ SA ∪ {(∅, ∅)}, a team member’s decision whether
to disclose evidence for A has an effect neither on the selection of the project nor on
the other member’s effort. The disclosure of A can therefore be guaranteed by making
the compensation under project A independent of the members’ messages, i.e. by setting
wi(A,A) = wi(A, ∅) = wi(∅, A) = wi(∅, ∅). In contrast, the disclosure of evidence for B is
optimal for member 1 if and only if
qpBBf0w1(B,B) + (1− q)pBBf0w1(B, ∅) ≥ qpBBf0w1(∅, B) + (1− q)pABf1w1(∅, ∅) (8)
and an analog condition needs to be satisfied by w2. Condition (8) can be relaxed by
increasing w1(B,B) or by decreasing w1(∅, ∅). However, due to budget balance, such
changes make the analog condition for w2 harder to satisfy. Since team members are
identical and implementability requires both conditions to be satisfied, it is therefore
optimal to set w1(B,B) = w1(∅, ∅) = 12 . For the same reason w1(B, ∅) = w2(∅, B) and
w1(∅, B) = w2(B, ∅). The conditions that guarantee the disclosure of evidence in favor of
B thus become:
w1(B, ∅) = w2(∅, B) ≥ 1
2
[q + (1− q)pAB
pBB
f1
f0
]. (9)
Note that the lower bound in (9) is strictly larger than 1
2
whenever pABf1 > pBBf0, i.e.
when motivation is favoured over adaptation. The implementability of the benchmark
then requires a reward for the unilateral revelation of evidence in favor of B. Since
rewards cannot exceed the team’s revenue, the disclosure of B can be induced if and only
if
1 ≥ 1
2
[q + (1− q)pAB
pBB
f1
f0
] ⇔ pBB
pAB
≥ 1− q
2− q (1 +
∆f
f0
) ≡ t∗(∆f). (10)
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The benchmark allocation also requires both team members to exert effort on project A.
As a consequence wi has to satisfy the following incentive constraints:
p˜A∆fwi(∅, mj) > c and pAA∆fwi(A,mj) > c for all mj ∈ {A, ∅}. (11)
Here p˜A denotes member i’s (updated) expectation of project A’s quality after observing
si = ∅, x = A, and wi(∅, A) = wi(∅, ∅). Since member i is able to infer that sj 6= B from
the choice of project A, his expectation is revised upwards. Using Bayes’ rule it can be
determined as:
p˜A =
1 + (1− q)pAB
2− q ∈ (p¯A, pAA). (12)
Since ∆f > 2c
p¯A
> 2c
p˜A
, the incentive constraints in (11) are satisfied by setting wi(A,A) =
wi(A, ∅) = wi(∅, A) = wi(∅, ∅) = 12 . In the Appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 1 The set of parameters for which the first–best allocation fails to be im-
plementable is given by T ∗∗(pAB, c) = {(∆f, pBBpAB ) ∈ T |
pBB
pAB
< t∗(∆f)}. T ∗∗ 6= ∅ if and
only if pAB <
c
f0
and q < q∗ ≡ 1 − pABf0
c
∈ (0, 1). For (∆f, pBB
pAB
) ∈ T ∗ ≡ T\T ∗∗ the first
best is implementable by a mechanism which shares revenue equally except for including
a reward for the unilateral disclosure of evidence for B when pABf1 > pBBf0.
Figure 1 depicts the case where the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisfied.16 The pa-
rameter space T , where a trade–off between adaptation and motivation exists, is the area
below the solid line. The first best is implementable in T ∗ but fails to be implementable
below the dashed line in the area denoted as T ∗∗.
The intuition for this result is as follows. When team members favor motivation
over adaptation, i.e. pABf1 > pBBf0, then the reward in (9) is necessary to induce the
disclosure of B. A decrease in q leads to an increase in the necessary reward since team
members are more tempted to raise their colleagues’ motivation via the concealment of
evidence. When q becomes sufficiently small, the necessary rewards exceed the upper
limit, 1, implied by the conditions of budget balance and limited liability. As a result,
the first best is no longer implementable.
16Given the parametric restrictions on pAB contained in (5), the requirement pAB <
c
f0
of Proposition
1 can be satisfied if and only if 2c1−f0 <
c
f0
⇔ f0 < 13 .
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Figure 1: Implementability of the first best: The first best is implementable in T ∗ but
fails to be implementable in T ∗∗. ∆fmin = 2c
p¯A
, ∆fmax = c
pAB
. Solid line: pBB
pAB
= c
pAB∆f
.
To understand the condition on pAB, note that the necessary reward is at its maximum
when the value of motivation is maximal, ∆f → ∆fmax, the value of adaptation is minimal
pBB
pAB
→ 1, and q → 0. The maximum necessary reward is 1
2
+ c
2pABf0
and exceeds the
maximum feasible reward, 1, if and only if pAB <
c
f0
.
We now briefly comment on the range of parameters which has so far been neglected
from our analysis. For ∆f < 2c
p¯A
, the first best fails to be implementable under symmetric
information. This is because, when s1 = s2 = ∅, both team members would require
strictly more than half of the project’s revenue to exert effort on project A. In contrast,
our analysis above shows that, under asymmetric information, both team members can be
induced to exert effort on project A as long as ∆f > 2c
p˜A
. Under the mechanism outlined
above, the selection of project A serves as a favorable signal about the project’s quality.
As a consequence, both team members update favourably their expectation of project A’s
quality (p˜A > p¯A) and can be induced to exert effort by receiving half of its revenue. We
summarize this finding as:
Remark 1 If 2c
p˜A
≤ ∆f < 2c
p¯A
and pBB
pAB
≥ t∗(∆f) then the first best is implementable
when team members have private information about the projects’ qualities but fails to be
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implementable when such information is publicly available.
This finding is reminiscent of Hermalin’s (1998) result that the efficiency of team pro-
duction can be improved when the access to information about the project’s quality is
restricted to one member, i.e. the leader. However, in Hermalin (1998) the improvement
derives from the leader’s ability to signal his private information via his choice of effort.
In contrast, in our model it is due to the mechanism’s ability to pool information in a
way which optimally manipulates the team members’ expectations.
We have so far characterized the conditions under which the first best is implementable
for a team with two identical members. In the next section we consider how these con-
ditions vary with the size of the team and study the effect of introducing heterogeneity
into our setup. However, before doing so, we discuss the influence of budget balance and
limited liability on the implementability of the first best.
The role of budget balance
Suppose we relax the requirement that the team has a balanced budget by letting w1+w2 ≤
R. In other words, we assume that the mechanism designer can commit to “burn money”.
Since we maintain limited liability, relaxing budget balance only affects the case where
R = 1.
We now ask whether, in the absence of budget balance, the mechanism designer can
implement the first best in a larger range of the parameter space. It follows from (8)
that the mechanism designer might want to “burn money” only in the case where no
information is disclosed and project A is selected. However, in this case, wi cannot
be reduced below c
p˜A∆f
in order to guarantee the provision of effort. We can therefore
substitute wA1 (∅, ∅) = cp˜A∆f in (8) to obtain the minimum value of
pBB
pAB
compatible with the
implementability of the first best. Without budget balance the first best is implementable
if and only if
pBB
pAB
≥ 1− q
2− q
(
1
∆f
+
1
f0
)
2c
p˜A
≡ t∗BB(∆f). (13)
Note that in contrast to the case of budget balance, the threshold t∗BB is decreasing in
∆f . In the absence of budget balance, an increase in the value of motivation ∆f has the
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additional effect of raising the amount of money that can be burned without harming the
incentives to exert effort. As a consequence, the first best becomes easier to implement
for higher values of motivation. The benchmark fails to be implementable in a non–empty
subset of T if and only if t∗BB(∆f
min) > 1 which is equivalent to
p¯A
2
<
c
f0
and q < 1− f0
2c+ f0(1− p¯A) ∈ (0, 1). (14)
Since p¯A > 2pAB these conditions are stronger than the corresponding conditions under
budget balance specified in Proposition 1.17 Relaxing budget balance therefore enlarges
the parameter set for which the first best is implementable. However, even after relaxing
budget balance, the first best fails to be implementable in a non–empty subset of the
parameter space.
The role of limited liability
Suppose we relax limited liability by assuming that wi ≥ −L where L > 0. The mechanism
designer can now punish the unilateral non–disclosure of B and increase the reward for the
unilateral disclosure of B by choosing w1(∅, B, 1) = −L and w1(B, ∅, 1) = 1+L. Moreover,
he can reward the unilateral disclosure of B not only when the project has been successful
but also in the absence of success by setting w1(B, ∅, 0) = L and w1(∅, B, 0) = −L.
Substitution of these compensations into (8) shows that the first best is implementable if
and only if
pBB
pAB
≥ 1− q
2− q (1 +
∆f
f0
)− 2L
(2− q)pABf0 ≡ t
∗
LL(∆f). (15)
An increase in L leads to a (parallel) downward shift of the implementability threshold
t∗LL(∆f). Following the argument of the proof of Proposition 1 one can show that the
benchmark fails to be implementable in a non–empty subset of T if and only if pAB <
c−2L
f0
and q < 1− pABf0+2L
c
. When L is sufficiently large, these conditions are no longer satisfied.
This shows that limited liability is essential for our result. When the unilateral non–
disclosure of B can be punished and the potential punishment is sufficiently large the first
best is implementable in the entire parameter space.
17Given the parametric restrictions on pAB contained in (5),
p¯A
2 <
c
f0
⇔ pAB < 4cf0 − 1 is possible if
and only if 2c1−f0 <
4c
f0
− 1⇔ f0 < 13 and c ∈ ( f0(1−f0)4−6f0 ,
1−f0
6 ).
17
4 Team size and heterogeneity
In this section we consider how the implementability of the first-best benchmark depends
on the team’s size and the heterogeneity of its members. In the first part we allow
for a general number N of identical team members. We obtain the surprising result,
that, although potentially detrimental to the incentive to provide effort, an increase in
team size can make the first best become implementable, due to a positive effect on the
members’ incentive to share information. In the second part we allow for heterogeneity,
by considering two team members who differ in their productivity and the likelihood with
which they become informed. Our results show that the incentive to conceal evidence
is stronger for the member who is less productive or more likely to be informed and we
determine how the optimal mechanism should account for this difference.
Team size
Consider a team with an arbitrary number N > 2 of members. The objective is to gener-
alize Proposition 1 and to understand how an increase in N affects the implementability
of the first–best allocation in the set T of parameters for which a trade–off between mo-
tivation and adaptation exists.18
Following our arguments in Section 3, consider a mechanism which distributes the
revenue of project A equally amongst all members and selects project B if and only if
evidence for B has been disclosed. Member i will exert effort on project A after observing
si = ∅ if and only if ∆f ≥ Ncp˜A(N) ≡ ∆fFN . As before, p˜A(N) denotes member i’s updated
belief about project A’s quality once project A has become selected. It is given by
p˜A(N) =
1 + (1− q)N−1pAB
1 + (1− q)N−1 (16)
and is increasing in N . In a team of size N the fact that project A has become selected
means that N − 1 members must have failed to observe evidence for B. Hence in a larger
team the selection of project A represents a more favorable signal regarding the quality
of the project. Note however, that this effect is more than compensated by the fact that
18 Pr(R = 1) ≤ 1 in T if and only if f0 + N∆fmax ≤ 1. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the
parametric restrictions in (5) to f0 < 1, c <
1−f0
N(2N−1) , and pAB ∈ [ Nc1−f0 , 13 ).
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in a larger team, revenue has to be divided amongst a higher number of members. In
particular, the term p˜A(N)
N
is decreasing in N which means that in a larger team free–riding
represents a greater obstacle to the implementation of the first–best effort levels.
While the negative effect of team size on effort incentives is standard in models of team
production19, in our setup team size also affects the members’ ability to share information.
In a bigger team, the concealment of evidence is potentially more rewarding since it can
boost the motivation of a higher number of colleagues. A countervailing effect arises since
the concealment of evidence is less likely to succeed in a bigger team. In other words, if
member i conceals evidence in favor of B, then N −1 team members can be motivated to
exert effort on project A. However, this only happens when all N−1 members have failed
to observe evidence, i.e. with probability (1− q)N−1. It is therefore not clear whether the
incentive to disclose evidence is increasing or decreasing in N .
A more subtle effect is that, in a larger team, there exists a wider range of possibilities
to reward the disclosure of information. In particular, evidence in favor of B can not only
be rewarded when it is disclosed unilaterally but whenever at least one other member
failed to disclose it. The incentive to disclose B is then maximized by sharing project B’s
revenue (equally) amongst all members who disclosed such evidence. Substitution of this
reward schedule into the generalized version of condition (8) shows that team members
can be induced to disclose evidence for B if and only if
pBBf0
N−1∑
k=0
(N−1k )q
k(1− q)N−1−k 1
1 + k
≥ pAB(f0 + (N − 1)∆f)(1− q)N−1 1
N
⇔ pBB
pAB
≥ q(1− q)
N−1
1− (1− q)N (1 + (N − 1)
∆f
f0
) ≡ t∗N (∆f). (17)
In the Appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 2 For a team with N > 2 members, the first best is implementable in T ∗N =
{(pBB
pAB
,∆f) ∈ T |∆f ≥ ∆fFN , pBBpAB ≥ t∗N(∆f)}. The first best fails to be implementable due
to free–riding in T FN = {(pBBpAB ,∆f) ∈ T |∆f < ∆fFN}, and due to a lack of information
disclosure in T IN = {(pBBpAB ,∆f) ∈ T |
pBB
pAB
< t∗N(∆f)}. T IN 6= ∅, if and only if pAB < cf0 and
q < q∗N . The thresholds t
∗
N and q
∗
N ∈ (0, 1) are decreasing in N .
19An exception is Adams (2006) who shows that the effect can be positive when team production
exhibits sufficiently strong complementarities.
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Proposition 2 extends Proposition 1 to the case of N > 2 team members. As before,
there exists a nonempty subset of T , denoted as T IN , for which the first best fails to be
implementable due to the team’s inability to disclose information. There now also exists a
subset of T , denoted as T FN , for which free–riding hinders the implementability of the first–
best allocation. For N = 2 this set was empty due to our focus on the parameter values
for which free–riding was not a source of inefficiency. The sets T IN and T
F
N are depicted
in Figure 4. Since q∗N and t
∗
N are decreasing in N , information sharing becomes less of
Figure 2: Team size N : The first best is implementable in T ∗N . It fails to be implementable
due to free–riding in T FN and due to a lack of information sharing in T
I
N . Increasing team
size to N + 1 makes the first best become implementable in the area between the dotted
lines.
a problem as the team size increases. Hence there may exist a subset of the parameter
space T for which an increase in team size actually improves the implementability of the
first best. This is confirmed by the following:
Corollary 1 If pAB < min(
1
2N+1
, c
f0
) and q∗N+1 ≤ q < q∗N , then there exists a subset
{(pBB
pAB
,∆f) ∈ T |∆f > ∆fFN+1, pBBpAB < t∗N (∆f)} 6= ∅ of the parameter space for which the
first best is implementable in a team of size N + 1 but not in a team of size N .
Corollary 1 provides sufficient conditions under which an increase in team size increases
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efficiency by making the first best become implementable.20 This contrasts with the
common view, based on free–riding alone, that efficiency is harder to achieve in larger
teams.
Note that for Corollary 1 to hold, it is crucial that the team rewards the disclosure
of evidence in favor of B. If instead, members received a fixed share 1
N
of the team’s
revenue, independently of the messages sent to the designer, then condition (17) would
become
pBB
pAB
≥ 1 + (N − 1)∆f
f0
. (18)
Intuitively, a member’s message would affect his payoff only when he is pivotal, i.e. the
only one to observe evidence. The incentives for concealment would then be stronger
in a larger team since, conditional on being pivotal, more colleagues could be motivated
with the concealment of evidence in favor of B. Hence, if compensation could not be
conditioned on messages, an increase in team size would affect the team’s ability to share
information negatively.
Note also that an increase in team size improves the information potentially available
to the team, due to the evidence observed by the added member. Corollary 1 shows that
the team can benefit from this added source of information not only marginally, but also
through its positive effect on the existing members’ disclosure incentives.
Heterogeneity
We now introduce heterogeneity into our framework. Team members may differ in their
“productivities”, i.e. their influence ∆fi on the project’s chances of success. They may
also differ in the likelihood qi with which they observe evidence. In the following we
assume that member 1 is either less productive (∆f1 < ∆f2, q1 = q2) or more likely to
be informed (q1 > q2, ∆f1 = ∆f1) than member 2. We maintain our assumption that
∆fi > ∆f
min for i ∈ {1, 2}. In order to minimize the team members’ incentive to conceal
evidence in favor of B it is still optimal to offer maximum rewards for the (unilateral)
20Given the parametric restrictions on pAB contained in footnote 18, pAB < min(
1
2N+1 ,
c
f0
) is possible
if and only if (N+1)c1−f0 < min(
1
2N+1 ,
c
f0
)⇔ f0 < 1N+2 .
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disclosure of B. From (8) it therefore follows that both team members disclose evidence
in favor of B if and only if max(g1, g2) ≤ pBBf0 where
gi = pAB(f0 +∆fj)wi(∅, ∅)− qj
1− qj pBBf0wi(B,B) (19)
can be interpreted as member i’s incentive to conceal B.
Note that for wi(∅, ∅) = wi(B,B) = 12 , it holds that g1 > g2, i.e. member 1 has a
stronger incentive to conceal evidence. This is because, for member 1, concealment is
either more likely to motivate his colleague (since member 2 is less likely to be informed)
or the resulting increase in effort has a stronger effect on the probability of success (since
member 2 is more productive). As a consequence, wi(∅, ∅) = wi(B,B) = 12 cannot be
optimal. Instead wi(∅, ∅) and wi(B,B) should be optimally chosen to give both members
an equal incentive for disclosure. This can be achieved either by decreasing w1(∅, ∅) or
by increasing w1(B,B). Lowering member 1’s incentive to conceal by decreasing w1(∅, ∅)
comes at a lower cost, i.e. a smaller increase in member 2’s incentive to conceal.21 In
order to implement the benchmark for the largest range of parameters it is therefore
necessary to set w1(∅, ∅) < 12 . However, this decrease in w1(∅, ∅) could potentially alter
the incentives to disclose evidence for A. One way to guarantee that A is disclosed is to
keep the allocation of project A’s revenue independent of messages by setting w1(A,A),
w1(A, ∅) and w1(A, ∅) equal to w1(∅, ∅). We summarize these findings as follows:
Proposition 3 If member 1 is less productive or more likely to be informed than member
2, then member 1 has a stronger incentive to conceal evidence for B. The optimal mech-
anism accounts for this by assigning a smaller share of project A’s revenue to member
1.
The optimal compensation scheme is characterized in more detail in the proof of Propo-
sition 3. Proposition 3 contrasts with the results of more standard models of team pro-
duction. To see this note that, in the absence of informational asymmetries, it could be
necessary to give a larger share of revenue to the member with the lower productivity if
21For ∆f1 < ∆f2, q1 = q2, decreasing g1 by one unit can be achieved by decreasing w1(∅, ∅) by
[pAB(f0+∆f2)]
−1 units or by increasingw1(B,B) by [
q
1−qpBBf0]
−1 units. This increases g2 by
f0+∆f1
f0+∆f2
< 1
or 1 units respectively. Similar for the case q1 > q2, ∆f1 = ∆f1.
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both members are to exert (discrete) effort. Indeed, when ∆f1 < ∆f
min, member 1 would
exert effort on project A only if w1(∅, ∅) ≥ cp¯A∆f1 > cp¯A∆fmin = 12 .
If we interpret project A as the status quo and project B as the adoption of changes,
our results suggest that teams more effectively adapt to a changing environment when
better informed members own smaller shares in the status quo and opinions in conflict
with the status quo are rewarded. In practice, better information often goes hand in hand
with higher stakes and dissenting voices are punished rather than rewarded. This may
help to explain why teams are less effective in the adoption of changes than would be
desirable.
5 Second best
We now return to our baseline model with two homogeneous team members in order
to characterize the optimal mechanism for the case where the benchmark fails to be
implementable. Hence in the following we assume that the conditions of Proposition 1
are satisfied so that T ∗∗ 6= ∅. The revelation principle allows us to restrict attention
to mechanisms in which team members reveal their private information to the designer.
Any revelation mechanism must, by definition, provide team members with incentives to
disclose evidence for B. In Section 3 we have seen that this may require a reward for the
unilateral disclosure of B. Furthermore, in T ∗∗ even the maximum feasible reward is not
sufficient to induce truth–telling, since the expected payoff from disclosure is smaller than
the expected payoff from concealment, i.e.
qpBBf0
1
2
+ (1− q)pBBf0 < 1
2
(1− q)pABf1. (20)
In this section we show that this relation can be reversed by allowing project or effort
choices to differ from the first best. We argue that there exist exactly three possibilities
to achieve this. The corresponding mechanisms differ with respect to the distortion that
they induce to the team’s project choice. We define the team’s project choice as exhibiting
a positive (negative) bias when the initially preferred alternative is selected more (less)
frequently than in the first best. The main insight of this section is that the second–
best mechanism may entail either a positive or a negative bias, or alternatively, induce
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first–best decision–making at the expense of inefficient effort choices.
Unbiased project choice
In order to strengthen the team members’ incentive to disclose B one may either increase
their payoff from disclosure or decrease their payoff from concealment. If the mechanism
is to implement the first–best project allocation, the former is not feasible and there exists
exactly one way in which the latter can be achieved. To see this, consider a mechanism
which differs from the one implementing the first best (with maximum rewards) only in
that, when no evidence is disclosed, it assigns the entire revenue to one member, say
member 1, i.e. w1(∅, ∅) = 1, and requests zero effort from the other, i.e. eˆr2(∅, ∅) = 0.
Under this mechanism the disclosure of B is optimal for member 1 since
qpBBf0
1
2
+ (1− q)f0pBB ≥ (1− q)f0pAB. (21)
Disclosure is optimal because, conditional on member 2 observing ∅, 1’s compensation and
2’s effort are independent of 1’s message, but the quality of the project chosen is strictly
higher following disclosure. Clearly, the disclosure of B is also optimal for member 2 since
he expects a zero payoff from concealment. Hence, assigning the project to one member
in the absence of evidence provides both members with incentives to disclose B.
Note however, that the above mechanism faces two problems. Firstly, since member 1
may obtain the project’s entire revenue not only by concealing B but also by concealing
A, we need to be concerned with his incentive to disclose A. Member 1’s incentive to
disclose A can be maximized without harm to member 2’s incentive to exert effort by
setting wA1 (A,A) = w
A
1 (A, ∅) =
(
1− c
∆f
)
and wA1 (∅, A) = c∆f . Given these choices, the
disclosure of A is optimal if and only if
f2
(
1− c
∆f
)
≥ qf2
(
1− c
∆f
)
+ (1− q)f1w1(∅, ∅). (22)
Secondly, note that in the absence of evidence, member 1 may want to induce member
2 to exert effort by offering a side–contract. If this side–contract assigns a share c
p¯A∆f
of
revenue to member 2 then member 2 will exert effort. Member 1 will offer such a contract,
thereby rendering the original mechanism void, if and only if the reduction in his share
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of revenue is more than compensated by the increased effort of member 2. In particular,
for the mechanism to be collusion–proof it has to hold that
p¯Af1w1(∅, ∅) ≥ p¯Af2(1− c
p¯A∆f
). (23)
Since w1(∅, ∅) ≤ 1, this implies that the first–best project choice cannot be implemented
if
f1 < f2(1− c
p¯A∆f
) ⇔ ∆f > c
p¯A
(
1 +
√
1 +
p¯Af0
c
)
≡ ∆f cp. (24)
In the Appendix we show that if (22) is violated for w1(∅, ∅) = 1 then setting w1(∅, ∅)
equal to the lower bound implied by (23) and w1(B,B) = 0 is sufficient to give both
members an incentive to disclose B. Hence we have the following:
Proposition 4 In T ∗∗ the first-best project allocation is implementable if and only if
∆f ≤ ∆f cp. The corresponding mechanism induces one member to exert inefficiently low
effort in the absence of evidence. ∆f cp > ∆fmin is increasing in f0 with limf0→0∆f
cp =
∆fmin.
Under the above mechanism, the loss of welfare relative to the first best is given by
∆W 0 = (1− q)2(p¯A∆f − c). (25)
Here we use the superindex “0” to highlight the fact that the team’s decision–making is
subject to a zero bias. The welfare loss is entirely due to the induced distortion of effort.
Negatively biased project choice
If we allow project choices to differ from the first best then there exists exactly one
alternative way in which the team members’ payoff from concealment can be decreased.
It consists of distorting the first–best project–selection rule by choosing project B rather
than project A when no evidence is disclosed. Combining this rule with maximum rewards
for the unilateral disclosure of B and equal revenue sharing in all other cases, the disclosure
condition is satisfied since
qpBBf0
1
2
+ (1− q)pBBf0 > 1
2
(1− q)pBBf0. (26)
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The mechanism biases the team’s decision–making negatively, i.e. against the direction
of the initially preferred alternative. In particular, when s = (∅, ∅), project B is selected
even though efficiency requires the choice of project A. Although, conditional on project
choice, the mechanism induces efficient effort levels, from an ex ante perspective effort is
inefficiently low. The loss of welfare relative to the first best can be written as
∆W− = (1− q)2 [(p¯A − p¯B) f0 + 2 (p¯A∆f − c)] (27)
where the superindex is chosen to account for the direction of the decision–making bias.
The revelation of information in conflict with prior expectations is now guaranteed by
the team’s commitment to take “unorthodox” decisions even in the absence of evidence
in their favor.
Positively biased project choice
The final way to strengthen the team members’ incentive to disclose B is to increase their
payoffs from disclosure. As can be seen from (20), the only way to achieve this is to induce
one of the agents to exert effort. When s = (B,B) this is not feasible since both members
are unwilling to exert effort independently of project choice and compensation. In this
case one member’s payoff from disclosure cannot be increased beyond pBBf0
1
2
without
decreasing the other member’s payoff. However, when s = (B, ∅), the mechanism could
select project A, offer both members equal shares of revenue, and request effort from the
uninformed member. If the mechanism makes first–best project choices and offers equal
shares for any other pair of types s 6∈ {(B, ∅), (B, ∅)}, then the uninformed member will
retain his prior expectations regarding the quality of project A. He will therefore be
willing to exert effort on project A. The disclosure condition is then trivially satisfied
since
qpBBf0
1
2
+ (1− q)pABf11
2
>
1
2
(1− q)pABf1. (28)
This mechanism does not reward the unilateral disclosure of B by promising a higher
share of revenue but instead by maintaining equal shares and inducing effort from the
uninformed team member. This clearly comes at the cost that the team’s decision making
becomes positively biased, i.e. in the direction of the initially preferred alternative. In
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other words, A becomes selected even when efficiency requires the choice of project B, i.e.
when s ∈ {(B, ∅), (B, ∅)}. Surplus is further reduced by the fact that one team member
is induced to exert an inefficiently high level of effort. The loss of welfare relative to the
first best can be written as
∆W+ = q(1− q) [(pBB − pAB) f0 + c− pAB∆f ] . (29)
Note that for the above mechanism to succeed two requirements are essential. Firstly,
messages to the mechanism designer must be confidential. Secondly, the uninformed team
member must not be able to deduce the informed member’s message from the outcome
of the mechanism. This requires that, when member i observes si = ∅, project choice and
compensation should be independent of member j’s message. Hence although the mecha-
nism is revealing in the sense of the revelation principle, information fails to be transmitted
across team members. In the spirit of the examples mentioned in the Introduction, in
order to maintain morale unpopular opinions fail to be shared at the cost of suboptimal
decisions. The mechanism is diametrically opposed to the one with a zero bias. While
the unbiased mechanism sacrifices motivation in order to ensure optimal adaptation the
positively biased mechanism permits sub–optimal project choices in exchange for a boost
in morale.
Comparison
The three mechanisms above constitute the only means by which the incentives to disclose
B can be strengthened. In order to derive the second–best mechanism it therefore remains
to compare the welfare losses of these three mechanisms. For this purpose, note that
the unbiased mechanism dominates the negatively biased mechanism, since it induces a
smaller welfare loss ∆W 0 < ∆W−. However, for ∆f > ∆f cp, the unbiased mechanism
fails to be collusion–proof. It therefore remains to compare ∆W+ with ∆W 0 for ∆f ≤
∆f cp and ∆W+ with ∆W− for ∆f > ∆f cp. These comparisons are straightforward:
∆W+ > ∆W 0 if and only if
pBB
pAB
> 1− c
qpABf0
+ (1 +
1− q
q
p¯A
pAB
)
∆f
f0
≡ t+0(∆f) (30)
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whereas ∆W+ > ∆W− if and only if
pBB
pAB
> 1 +
1− q − 2(2− q) c
f0
(1 + q)pAB
+
2(1− q + pAB)
(1 + q)pAB
∆f
f0
≡ t+−(∆f). (31)
Using these thresholds we can characterize the subsets of parameters for which each of
the three mechanisms constitutes the second best:
T 0 = {(∆f, pBB
pAB
) ∈ T ∗∗|∆f ≤ ∆f cp, pBB
pAB
≥ t+0(∆f)} (32)
T− = {(∆f, pBB
pAB
) ∈ T ∗∗|∆f ≥ ∆f cp, pBB
pAB
≥ t+−(∆f)}
T+ = T ∗∗\(T 0 ∪ T−).
Proposition 5 In T+ or T− the second–best mechanism imposes a positive or negative
bias to the team’s project choice. In T 0 the team’s project choice is unbiased but effort
is inefficiently low. T+ 6= ∅ since ∆W+ → 0 for (∆f, pBB
pAB
) → (∆fmax, 1). Finally, for
any (c, pAB, q) such that c <
1
6
, pAB ∈ (2c, 13) and q ∈ (1 − p¯A−2pAB2−p¯A , 1), there exists a
fmax0 ∈ (0, 13) such that T− 6= ∅ and T 0 6= ∅ for all f0 < fmax0 .
Proposition 5 characterizes the second–best allocation and provides conditions under
which each of the three corresponding mechanisms are optimal in a non–empty subset
of T ∗∗. Figure 3 depicts the case where these conditions are satisfied. As can be seen
from the Figure, an unbiased project–choice rule is part of the second–best mechanism
only when the value of motivation is relatively low. In this case, the trade–off between
adaptation and motivation is resolved by ensuring first–best decision–making at the ex-
pense of depressing morale. Instead, when the value of motivation is relatively high, the
team’s decision–making exhibits a bias and adaptation fails to be first best. The bias may
be in favor or against the team’s initially preferred alternative. A positive bias induces
efforts which are inefficiently high while a negative bias leads to efforts which are ineffi-
ciently low. It follows that a positive bias is preferable when the value of motivation is
high.
To conclude, the likelihood of adopting the initially preferred alternative is non–
monotonic in the relative value of motivation. Similarly, the overall level of effort initially
decreases as the value of motivation increases and the optimal mechanism switches from
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Figure 3: Second best. The set T ∗∗ where the first best fails to be implementable is divided
into three areas T+, T−, and T 0 where project choice exhibits a positive, negative, or zero
bias respectively.
being unbiased to being negatively biased. Effort then increases as the value of motivation
increases further and a morale–boosting positively–biased project choice becomes part of
the optimal mechanism.
Random Mechanisms
We close this section with a discussion of random mechanisms. Due to the applied focus
of our model, we have restricted attention to deterministic mechanisms. Allowing for
stochastic mechanisms does not improve the implementability of the first best but can
increase the level of surplus that is achieved with second–best alternatives. To see this,
consider the following randomization of the negative–bias mechanism. Suppose that, in
the absence of evidence, the mechanism selects project A with probability α and project
B with probability 1 − α. Our analysis above has shown that for α = 0 team members
strictly prefer disclosure over concealment. Since surplus is increasing in α, welfare can
therefore be increased by selecting the maximum α for which the disclosure of evidence
is still guaranteed. This value is readily determined and given by
α∗ =
pBBf0
(1− q)(pABf1 − pBBf0) . (33)
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α∗ is increasing in the value of adaptation and decreasing in the value of motivation
and converges to 1 as pBB
pAB
→ t∗(∆f). This implies that, in the proximity of the imple-
mentability threshold t∗, the first best can be approximated by a random mechanism.
Similar randomized versions exist for the mechanisms with a positive or zero bias.
It can easily be shown that the implementability of an unbiased project choice re-
mains limited by the requirement of collusion–proofness and that, for pBB
pAB
→ 1 and
∆f → ∆fmax, only a positive bias mechanism is capable of approximating the first best.
Moreover, it is easy to show that the optimal mechanism should be one of the three (ran-
domized) mechanisms discussed above rather than any combination of them. We therefore
expect the characterization of the second best to be qualitatively similar to Figure 3 with
each deterministic mechanism substituted by its randomized equivalent.
6 Robustness
Our model assumes that information is verifiable and that individual efforts are inde-
pendent inputs of production. In this section we show that Proposition 1 remains qual-
itatively unchanged when we relax these assumptions. We first consider the case where
team members receive unverifiable signals. Secondly, we allow for complementarities.
The main insight in this section is that an increase in the signals’ precision or in the
strength of complementarities makes the set of parameters for which the first best fails to
be implementable become smaller, without reducing it to ∅.
Non–verifiable information
So far, our analysis has focused on the team’s ability to share verifiable evidence. Suppose
instead that member i observes an unverifiable signal si ∈ {A,B}. Conditional on the
state of the world being y, si = y with probability q˜ ∈ (12 , 1). The parameter q˜ ∈ (12 , 1)
denotes the precision of the team members’ information and is the analog of the parameter
q in the baseline model. In both models, the parameter represents the likelihood with
which a team member is correctly informed.
In the baseline model it was necessary to assume that pAB > 0. Otherwise, team
members would have always preferred adaptation over motivation. When team members
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receive ”soft” signals this assumption is no longer necessary for a trade–off between adap-
tation and motivation to exist. In the following we therefore simplify the exposition by
assuming that pAB = 0.
As before we assume that information is valuable. In particular, we suppose that
project A is (expected to be) better when the two signals point towards A, while project
B is better when both signals point towards B. Without loss of generality, we let project
A be better when the signals differ from each other. These assumptions require that
1 > pBB >
(1− q˜)2
q˜2
. (34)
The mechanism and the induced game are as before, with the obvious difference that
message spaces are no longer type dependent. More specifically, type si ∈ {A,B} chooses
mi ∈ {A,B}.
In order to match the assumptions of the original model, we assume that both team
members can be induced to exert effort on project A even when their beliefs are identical
to the prior (which happens when s1 6= s2). As before, we also assume that it is inefficient
to exert effort on project B even when both signals point towards B. These assumptions
require that
4c < ∆f <
q˜2 + (1− q˜)2
q˜2
c
pBB
. (35)
In summary, the set
T˜ (c, q˜) = {(∆f, pBB)|4c < ∆f < q˜
2 + (1− q˜)2
q˜2
c
pBB
, 1 > pBB >
(1− q˜)2
q˜2
} (36)
represents the analog to the set T in our baseline model.22 This benchmark allocation is
similar to the one in our baseline model. In particular, project B should be selected if
and only if s1 = s2 = B, and eˆ
∗
i (s1, s2) = 1 unless s1 = s2 = B.
We now proceed to examine whether this benchmark allocation can be implemented.
Following the reasoning in Section 3, symmetry implies that truth–telling incentives are
maximized by setting wi(B,B) = wi(A,A) =
1
2
. It remains to consider w1(B,A).
22To guarantee that T˜ is non–empty and that Pr(R = 1) ≤ 1 for all (∆f, pBB) ∈ T˜ the following
parametric restrictions are necessary and sufficient: f0 < 1, q˜ >
3
2 − 12
√
3, and c < 12 (1− f0) (1−q˜)
2
q˜2+(1−q˜)2 .
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Let I1(B,B) denote member 1’s incentive to issue m1 = B after observing s1 = B.
I1(B,B) is given by the difference in (expected) payoffs from issuing m1 = B and m1 = A
respectively. Member 1 reports s1 = B truthfully if and only if I1(B,B) ≥ 0. We have
I1(B,B) = q˜
2pBBf0
1
2
− (1− q˜)2f1[1− w1(B,A)] + q˜(1− q˜)f2[w1(B,A)− 1
2
]. (37)
If pBB ≥ (1−q˜)2q˜2 (1 + ∆ff0 ), setting w1(B,A) = 12 is sufficient to induce truth-telling, i.e. the
benchmark is implementable by an equal share contract, wi(m1, m2) =
1
2
for all (m1, m2).
In the remainder we can therefore restrict attention to the case where pBB <
(1−q˜)2
q˜2
(1+∆f
f0
).
For pBB <
(1−q˜)2
q˜2
(1 + ∆f
f0
) a reward w1(B,A) >
1
2
is necessary to induce truth-telling
of B. As a consequence we also have to be concerned with the team members’ incentive
to truthfully reveal the signal A. This is because the prospect of a potential reward
for issuing B (unilaterally) gives members a reason to issue B rather than A. To take
account of this possibility, let I1(B,A) denote member 1’s incentive to issue m1 = B after
observing s1 = A. Member 1 will misrepresent his information by issuing m1 = B if and
only if I1(B,A) ≥ 0. We have
I1(B,A) = 2q˜(1− q˜)
[
1
4
pBBf0 − 1
2
f2[1− w1(B,A)] + c
]
+ q˜2f2[w1(B,A)− 1
2
]. (38)
To induce truth–telling the mechanism has to choose a w1(B,A) such that I1(B,B) ≥ 0
and I1(B,A) < 0. In the Appendix we show that if w1(B,A) makes the B–type indifferent
between truth–telling and lying, then the A-type will tell the truth. Hence truth–telling
can be guaranteed by choosing the w1(B,A) which solves I1(B,B) = 0, i.e.
w1(B,A) = 1− q˜
2pBBf0 + q˜(1− q˜)f2
2(1− q˜) [q˜f2 + (1− q˜)f1] ≡ w¯1(B,A) ∈ (
1
2
, 1). (39)
It remains to consider the members’ incentive to exert effort on project A. Note
that after observing s1 = B and reporting m1 = B, member 1 can infer s2 = A from
the selection of project A. Similarly, after observing s2 = A and reporting m2 = A,
member 2 can infer s1 = B from observing w2(B,A) >
1
2
= w2(A,A). Hence both
members will expect project A’s quality to be equal to its prior value of 1
2
. In order to
induce efficient effort levels for project A, w1(B,A) therefore has to satisfy the following
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incentive constraints:
2c
∆f
≤ w1(B,A) ≤ 1− 2c
∆f
. (40)
As in the baseline model without budget balance, the reward for member 1 is restricted
by the incentive constraint of member 2. The benchmark is implementable if and only
w¯(B,A) ≤ 1− 2c
∆f
which is equivalent to
pBB ≥ 1− q˜
q˜
[
4c
q˜f0
(1 + q˜ +
f0
∆f
)− 1− 2∆f
f0
]
≡ t˜∗(∆f). (41)
Note that the threshold t˜∗(∆f) is decreasing in q˜. Moreover, in the Appendix we show
that no further restrictions on the parameters f0, c, and q˜ are required to ensure that
the benchmark fails to be implementable in a non–empty subset of T˜ . We can therefore
summarize our findings as follows:
Remark 2 When team members receive unverifiable signals with precision q˜ ∈ (1
2
, 1), the
first best fails to be implementable in T˜ ∗∗(q˜) = {(∆f, pBB) ∈ T˜ |pBB < t˜∗(∆f)} 6= ∅. If
the signals’ precision increases from q˜ to q˜′ then T˜ ∗∗(q˜′) ⊂ T˜ ∗∗(q˜).
As in the baseline model, the benchmark becomes implementable in a larger subset of the
parameter space when team members are better informed about the projects’ qualities.
The reason is that the misrepresentation of information is in that case less likely to result
in an increase in motivation.
In comparison to the baseline model, the model with unverifiable signals has an addi-
tional feature encouraging truth-telling which is similar to the subordinate’s incentive to
conform with the views of his superior in Prendergast (1993), or to the leader’s propensity
to pander to his follower’s opinion in Blanes i Vidal and Mo¨ller (2007). In particular, each
team member has an interest to issue a message that reinforces rather than contradicts
the other member’s signal. Since messages are issued simultaneously and signals are more
likely to coincide than to contradict each other, members therefore have an additional in-
centive to tell the truth. We find it reassuring that our main result remains qualitatively
unchanged even in the presence of such a propensity to agree.
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Complementarities
Our model assumes that individual efforts are independent inputs of the team’s production
function. In this section we generalize Proposition 1 by allowing for the existence of
complementarities. For this purpose suppose that, as before, f1 − f0 = ∆f but let
f2−f1 = (1+γ)∆f . The parameter γ > 0 measures the strength of complementarities. As
before we assume that efficiency requires zero effort on project B, i.e. pBB(2+γ)∆f < 2c,
while equal revenue sharing is sufficient to induce both team members to exert effort
on project A, i.e. 1
2
p¯A∆f > c.
23 In the presence of complementarities assumption (3)
therefore becomes
2c
(2 + γ)pBB
> ∆f >
2c
p¯A
. (42)
The parametric restrictions which guarantee the possibility of a trade–off between adap-
tation and motivation are modified to
f0 < 1, c <
1− f0
6 + 4γ
, pAB ∈ [ 2c
1− f0 ,
1
3 + γ
). (43)
The existence of complementarities has no influence on the threshold t∗, since a team
member who conceals evidence for B will refrain from exerting effort on project A. How-
ever, the condition under which the benchmark fails to be implementable in a non–empty
subset of T , t∗(∆fmax) > 1, now depends on the parameter γ through ∆fmax = 2c
(2+γ)pAB
.
It is satisfied if and only if
pAB <
2c
(2 + γ)f0
and q < 1− (2 + γ)pABf0
2c
. (44)
The upper bound on pAB in (44) is larger than the lower bound in (43) if and only if
f0 <
1
3+γ
. The fact that all upper bounds are positive and decreasing in γ implies the
following:
Remark 3 Even in the presence of complementarities, the benchmark fails to be im-
plementable in a non–empty subset of the parameter space. Increasing the strength of
complementarities reduces the parameter space for which the benchmark fails to be imple-
mentable.
23Note that in the presence of complementarities, an equilibrium e1 = e2 = 1 may coexist with an
equilibrium e1 = e2 = 0. Our assumption guarantees that e1 = e2 = 1 constitutes the unique equilibrium.
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7 Conclusion
In private and public organizations, teams are often allocated the dual task of taking
and implementing a decision. In this paper we have investigated the link between the
incentive to share decision–relevant information and the motivation to exert effort in this
type of team setting. Our key trade–off makes team members reluctant to disclose infor-
mation in conflict with an initially preferred alternative in situations where maximizing
the colleagues’ motivation is more important than the adoption of the best project. To
overcome this, the optimal mechanism includes a reward for the disclosure of unpopular
information. Counterintuitively, we show that an increase in team size can make the first
best become implementable, and hence lead to an improvement in efficiency.
If the first best is not implementable, three candidates for the second–best mechanism
emerge. While the implementation of the first–best project choice requires a downward
distortion of effort and is optimal for low values of motivation, for intermediate and high
values of motivation project choice will be biased against or in favor of the team’s initially
preferred alternative respectively.
What specific institutional form could these mechanisms take? One possibility for the
team to commit to a biased project choice is the delegation of decision–making rights to an
outsider, e.g. a manager. Consider for instance a manager who neither obtains any private
information nor exerts any implementation effort himself. To give project choice a negative
bias, the manager could select the team’s preferred project in the presence of evidence,
but project B rather than A in its absence.24 This mechanism could then be interpreted as
Garicano’s (2000) principle of “management by exception”. The interpretation of biased
project choices as delegation also resonates well with Holmstrom (1982). In his paper
the principal provides optimal incentives to exert effort by allowing the team to break
the budget. By contrast in our model the manager provides optimal incentives to share
information by enabling the team to take unpopular decisions.
24This may be motivated in two ways. First, as in Landier et al. (2009), the manager’s preferences may
differ from the team’s. For example, when A represents the status quo and B represents the introduction
of changes, a manager who has been hired from outside may be more inclined to implement changes.
Second, as in Ferreira and Rezende (2007), the manager’s position may allow him to commit to an ex
post inefficient project selection rule by publicly announcing his plans or “vision”.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We have already shown that the benchmark is implementable if and only if pBB
pAB
≥ 1−q2−q (1+ ∆ff0 ).
Moreover, by definition, for all (∆f, pBB
pAB
) ∈ T it holds that pBB
pAB
< c
pAB∆f
. While the lower
bound on pBB
pAB
is increasing in ∆f , the upper bound is decreasing. The benchmark therefore
fails to be implementable in a non–empty subset of T if and only if the lower bound exceeds the
upper bound at ∆fmax = maxT ∆f =
c
pAB
, i.e.
1− q
2− q (1 +
∆fmax
f0
) >
c
pAB∆fmax
= 1 ⇔ pAB < c(1− q)
f0
. (45)
This holds if and only if
pABf0 < c and q < 1− pABf0
c
. (46)
Proof of Proposition 2
It remains to determine the conditions under which T IN 6= ∅. Since t∗N is increasing in ∆f ,
T IN 6= ∅ if and only if t∗N (∆fmax) > 1. Given ∆fmax = cpAB , this is equivalent to
pAB <
c
f0
(N − 1)q(1− q)N−1
1− (1− q)N−1 =
c
f0
(1− q)P (q,N). (47)
Here P (q,N) denotes the probability that evidence is observed by exactly one out of N − 1
members, conditional on evidence being observed by at least one out of N−1 members. P (q,N)
is strictly decreasing in q and in N with limq→0 P (q,N) = 1 and limq→1 P (q,N) = 0. Hence
(47) holds if and only if
pAB <
c
f0
and q < q∗N (48)
for some q∗N ∈ (0, 1) and q∗N is decreasing in N . The fact that P (q,N) is decreasing in N also
implies that t∗N is decreasing in N .
Proof of Corollary 1
q ≥ q∗N+1 implies that T IN+1 = ∅. Moreover, from pAB < 12N+1 it follows that (N+1)cp˜A(N+1) < ∆fmax.
Taken together this implies that (pBB
pAB
,∆f) ∈ T ∗N+1 if ∆f ≥ (N+1)cp˜A(N+1) . Finally, since pAB <
c
f0
,
and q < q∗N , there exist (
pBB
pAB
,∆f) ∈ T such that ∆f ≥ (N+1)c
p˜A(N+1)
and pBB
pAB
< t∗N (∆f). For all
those parameter values, the first best is implementable in a team with N +1 members but fails
to be implementable in a team with N members.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Setting w1(A,A) = w1(A, ∅) = w1(∅, A) = w1(∅, ∅) the disclosure of A is guaranteed. Setting
w1(B, ∅) = 1 and w1(∅, B) = 0, member i’s incentive to conceal is gi(wi(∅, ∅), wi(B,B)) as
defined in (10). In the following we characterize the compensations w1(∅, ∅) and w1(B,B) which
minimize the members’ “aggregate” incentive to conceal, G ≡ max(g1, g2), subject to budget
balance, limited liability and incentive constraints. Starting from w1(∅, ∅) = w1(B,B) = 12 ,
w1(∅, ∅) should be reduced as long as g1(w1(∅, ∅), 12 ) > g2(1−w1(∅, ∅), 12). However, for member
1 to provide effort on project A we require that w1(∅, ∅) ≥ cp˜A∆f1 . If the degree of heterogeneity
∆f2−∆f1 is larger than some threshold h (to be determined below), then for w1(∅, ∅) = cp˜A∆f1 it
will still hold that g1(w1(∅, ∅), 12) > g2(1−w1(∅, ∅), 12). In this case w1(B,B) should be increased
as long as g1(
c
p˜A∆f1
, w1(B,B)) > g2(1 − cp˜A∆f1 , 1 − w1(B,B)). In contrast, when the degree
of heterogeneity is small, i.e. ∆f2 − ∆f1 ≤ h, then there exists some w1(∅, ∅) ∈ ( cp˜A∆f1 ,
1
2)
such that g1(w1(∅, ∅), 12) = g2(1 − w1(∅, ∅), 12) = G. In this case, G can be reduced further
by simultaneously decreasing w1(∅, ∅) and w1(B,B). To see this, note that a reduction in
w1(∅, ∅) decreases g1 by more than it increases g2. A reduction in w1(B,B) raises g1 by the
same amount as it lowers g2 and can therefore be used to restore equality but at a lower level
g1 = g2 = G
′ < G. Optimally w1(∅, ∅) and w1(B,B) are therefore reduced until one of the two
reaches its lower bound given by c
p˜A∆f1
and 0 respectively. The threshold h can be determined
from g1(
c
p˜A∆f1
, 12) = g2(1− cp˜A∆f1 , 12) and is given by
h = 2(f0 +∆f1)(
p˜A∆f1
2c
− 1) > 0. (49)
In summary, we have shown that the optimal compensation scheme can be characterized as
follows: if ∆f2 > ∆f1+h, then w1(∅, ∅) = cp˜A∆f1 < 12 and w1(B,B) > 12 . If ∆f2 < ∆f1+h, then
either w1(∅, ∅) = cp˜A∆f1 < 12 and w1(B,B) ∈ (0, 12) or w1(∅, ∅) ∈ ( cp˜A∆f1 , 12 ) and w1(B,B) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Consider the members’ incentives to exert effort on project A. If member 2 observes s2 = ∅,
xˆ = A, and eˆr2 = 0 then he knows that member 1 must have observed s1 = ∅. If instead he
observes s2 = ∅, xˆ = A, and eˆr2 = 1 then he learns s1 = A. His incentive constraints therefore
read as follows;
w2(A,A), w2(A, ∅), w2(∅, A) ≥ c
∆f
and w2(∅, ∅) < c
p¯A∆f
. (50)
Now consider member 1. After observing s1 = ∅, xˆ = A, and eˆr1 = 1 he knows that s2 ∈ {A, ∅}.
If w1(∅, ∅) 6= w1(∅, A) he also learns from the observation of the share assigned to him whether
s2 = ∅ or s2 = A. In the following we assume that w1(∅, ∅) 6= w1(∅, A) is satisfied. At the end
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we confirm that this assumption is indeed satisfied by the proposed mechanism. Hence member
1’s incentive constraints read as follows;
w1(A,A), w1(A, ∅), w1(∅, A) ≥ c
∆f
and w1(∅, ∅) ≥ c
p¯A∆f
. (51)
Member 1 has an incentive to disclose A if and only if
qf2w1(A,A) + (1− q)f2w1(A, ∅) ≥ qf2w1(∅, A) + (1− q)f1w1(∅, ∅) (52)
Without violating (50) or (51) we can set w1(A,A) = w1(A, ∅) =
(
1− c∆f
)
and w1(∅, A) = c∆f
to maximize member 1’s incentive to disclose A. Given these choices, (52) becomes
w1(∅, ∅) ≤
f2
[
1− (1 + q) c∆f
]
f1(1− q) , (53)
and member 2 is guaranteed to disclose A since w2(A,A) = w2(A, ∅) and w2(∅, A) = 1 − c∆f >
1
2 >
c
p¯A∆f
> w2(∅, ∅) from (50). For the mechanism to be collusion proof we also require that
w1(∅, ∅) ≥ (1 − c
p¯A∆f
)
f2
f1
(54)
The RHS is larger than 1 if and only if ∆f > ∆f cp. Hence for ∆f > ∆f cp the first-best project
allocation is not implementable and in the remainder we can restrict attention to the case where
∆f ≤ ∆f cp.
Using ∆f > ∆fmin = 2c
p¯A
it is immediate that collusion–proofness implies the remaining
incentive constraints w1(∅, ∅) ≥ cp¯A∆f and w2(∅, ∅) < cp¯A∆f . Hence the disclosure of A is guar-
anteed, appropriate effort incentives are provided and the mechanism is collusion–proof if and
only if
(1− c
p¯A∆f
)
f2
f1
≤ w1(∅, ∅) < f2
f1
1− (1 + q) c∆f
1− q . (55)
The lower bound is smaller than the upper bound since (1− q)(1− c
p¯A∆f
) < 1− (1+ q) c∆f holds
for q = 0 and q = 1 and hence for all q ∈ (0, 1). It remains to consider the team members’
incentive to disclose B. Member 1 will disclose B if and only if
qpBBf0w1(B,B) + (1− q)pBBf0 ≥ (1− q)pABf0w1(∅, ∅) (56)
while for member 2 the corresponding condition reads
qpBBf0w2(B,B) + (1− q)pBBf0 ≥ (1− q)pABf1w2(∅, ∅). (57)
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Since pBB > pAB, (56) is satisfied for any choice of w1(B,B) and w1(∅, ∅). Hence we can set
w2(B,B) = 1 and choose the lowest w2(∅, ∅) consistent with (55) in order to maximize member
2’s incentive to disclose B. (57) then becomes
pBB
pAB
≥ 1− (1 + q)
[
1− c
∆f
+
∆f
f0
(1− 2c
∆f
)
]
. (58)
This condition holds in T since pBB > pAB and the RHS is strictly smaller than 1. Finally, it is
straightforward to show that f2
f1
1−(1+q) c
∆f
1−q = w1(∅, ∅) > c∆f = w1(∅, A) as assumed. This shows
that the first-best project choice is implementable for all ∆f ≤ ∆f cp.
Proof of Proposition 5
It is straight forward to see that ∆W+ → 0 for (∆f, pBB
pAB
) → (∆fmax, 1) and thus T+ 6= ∅.
It remains to show that T− 6= ∅ and T 0 6= ∅ under the conditions stated in the proposition.
The proof proceeds in four steps. Step 1: Since c < 16 and pAB > 2c there exists a f
1
0 ∈ (0, 1)
such that c < 1−f06 and pAB >
2c
1−f0
and hence T 6= ∅ for all f0 < f10 . Step 2: Since ∆f cp is
increasing in f0 and limf0→0∆f
cp = ∆fmin, there exists a f20 > 0 such that ∆f
cp < ∆fmax for
all f0 < f
2
0 . Step 3: Since t
∗(∆fmin) = 1−q2−q (1 +
2c
p¯Af0
) is strictly decreasing in f0 and tends to
infinity for f0 → 0, there exists a f30 > 0 such that t∗(∆fmin) > p¯A2pAB for all f0 < f30 . Note that
t∗(∆fmin) > p¯A2pAB is equivalent to T
∗∗ = T . It follows from Proposition 1 that f30 <
1
3 . Step 4:
Note that t+−(∆f cp) < 1 if and only if
(1− q)f0 − 2(2− q)c+ 2(1− q + pAB)∆f cp < 0. (59)
Since ∆f cp is increasing in f0, the LHS is increasing in f0. Since ∆f
cp is independent of f0 and
2(c−∆f cp)− f0 < 0, the LHS is decreasing in q. The inequality therefore holds if and only if
q > qmin ≡ 1− 2c− 2pAB∆f
cp
f0 − 2(c−∆f cp) (60)
and qmin is increasing in f0. Moreover limf0→0 q
min = 1 − p¯A−2pAB2−p¯A < 1 = limf0→0 q∗. Hence
there exist a f40 > 0 such that t
+−(∆f cp) < 1 for all f0 < f
4
0 . We have therefore shown that
for all f0 < f
max
0 = min(f
1
0 , f
2
0 , f
3
0 , f
4
0 ) ∈ (0, 13 ) it holds that T ∗∗ = T 6= ∅, ∆f cp < ∆fmax, and
t+−(∆f cp) < 1. These conditions imply T− 6= ∅ and T 0 6= ∅.
Proof of Remark 2
To abbreviate notation, let w1(B,A) = w. We first show that if w satisfies I1(B,B) = 0 then
I1(B,A) < 0. If w = 1− 2c∆f , then I1(B,A) simplifies to
I1(B,A) = q˜(1− q˜)[pBBf0 1
2
− f1(1− w)] + q˜2f2(w − 1
2
). (61)
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This is because member 1 no longer values the opportunity to exert effort on project A, given
s1 = A 6= B = s2. If in addition I1(B,B) = 0 then
f2(w − 1
2
) =
1− q˜
q˜
f1(1− w)− q˜
1− q˜ f0pBB
1
2
(62)
can be substituted into (61) to get
I1(B,A) = f0pBB
1
2
q˜(1− q˜)
(
1− q˜
2
(1− q˜)2
)
< 0. (63)
Hence if the maximum feasible reward is paid and the B-type is indifferent between m1 = A
and m1 = B then the A-type strictly prefers m1 = A over m1 = B. It remains to show that
the same is true when w < 1 − 2c∆f . For this purpose, define ∆I1 = I1(B,B) − I1(B,A). ∆I1
measures the difference in the incentives to issue m1 = B between the B-type and the A-type.
The B-type has a stronger incentive to issue B than the A-type if and only if ∆I1 ≥ 0. Note
∂∆I1
∂w
= (1− q˜)2f1 − q˜2f2 < 0. (64)
A decrease in the reward makes the A-type become less inclined to issue m1 = B relative to the
B-type. Also note that
∂∆I1
∂pBB
= f0q˜(q˜ − 1
2
) > 0. (65)
An increase in pBB makes the A-type become less inclined to issue m1 = B relative to the
B-type. Now starting from the implementability threshold pBB = t˜
∗(∆f) for which w = 1− 2c∆f ,
an increase in pBB lowers the w necessary to make the B-type indifferent. Both changes make
the A-type become even less inclined to issue m1 = B relative to the B-type. This shows that if
w < 1− 2c∆f is chosen to make the B-type indifferent between truth–telling and lying, then the
A-type will tell the truth.
It remains to show that T˜ ∗∗ 6= ∅. To see this note that t˜∗(∆f) is decreasing in ∆f . Hence
T˜ ∗∗ 6= ∅ if and only if t˜∗(∆fmin) > pminBB . Substitution of ∆fmin = 4c and pminBB = (1−q˜)
2
q˜2
into
this condition shows that the condition is equivalent to q˜ < 1 which is satisfied by assumption.
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